The Argumentative Indian - Pt. 3

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My third and last instalment in my review of “The Argumentative Indian”. Coming ages after I wrote the first two parts! The book has been laying on my shelf, fully read but not fit for storing away since i wanted to write this, my reaction to what Mr. Sen has to say about India and the Bomb.
He seems to think that it was an irredeemably bad idea for India to have tested in 1998. His strident anti BJP stand may in part be responsible for this. I am in no way a supporter of the BJP, far from it, but my antipathy does not go to such extremes that I will criticize any and all of their actions.
He first claims that a lower chance of an Indo-Pak war is not an advantage given the risk of a nuclear holocaust if a war does take place. However, I fail to see how it is a given that any war between the two countries will irrevocably result in a nuclear exchange. Surely, even Pakistani strategists realize that a nuclear exchange can only result in the utter destruction of their country.
He next goes on to give the example of Kargil and says that the threat of nuclear retaliation made India hold back from fully retaliating and placing forces behind the intruders, beyond the LOC. While that was certainly one of the strategies discussed during the conflict, Indian governments have traditionally been loath to take proactive measures, even the more hawkish ones like the NDA that was in power at the time. The Indian army did use its full conventional might to force the terrorists/armymen to withdraw, but in keeping with our more peaceful ideals they did not cross the LOC. If anything, the thought that India might be forced to take such a drastic step only forced the US to intervene earlier than they normally would have. Sharif was read the riot act in Washington and Musharraf was told in no uncertain terms that he would have to pull his men back.
That any madman could get his hands on the Pakistani nukes has been a possibility causing much loss of sleep all over the world. Nuclear power in the hands of terrorists is the stuff thriller novels are made of. But how has Indian testing made that any more possible? We must realise that there were Nukes in Pakistan long before India tested in 1998. It’s not as if they suddenly developed the A-bomb in two weeks of May! They’ve had them for some time now and I can’t believe the US didn’t know about this. This just brought it out in the open. Which raises the important though not pertinent question to this discussion of why no one even wonders how the Pakistani nukes were developed? Surely this must have been under development for decades, or they got them readymade from somewhere, and we all know where. But that’s a question for another time and place. Here it only needs to be pointed out that Indian testing in no way made the Pakistani nukes more accessible to terrorists. On the topic it may also be worthwhile to point out that the greatest risk of nuclear weapons finding their way to the terrorists comes from the erstwhile Soviet republics, but that’s beside the point.
Mr Sen’s point that nuclear detente is not a tenable theory holds little water. In his view the detente of the Cold War was more a matter of luck than anything else, and that we may not be so lucky in the subcontinent. I don’t have such little faith in human common sense. Mr. Sen seems to think of nuclear enabled governments as if they were kids with toys, and at the least provocation they would launch a full nuclear assault. In my view, once the first flush of nuclear power passes, countries become acutely aware of the risks involved in nuclear adventurism, and while there may a lot of sabre rattling both sides of the border, nuclear exchange remains a remote possibility.
The Kargil point is repeated when Mr. Sen thinks that we have frittered away our conventional advantage by forcing Pakistan to go nuclear. I have discussed this point before and I will detail it again. Pakistan did not develop the bomb within two weeks of the Indian explosions of Pokhran II. They already had them and this only gave them an excuse to go public with it, something I’m sure they were itching to do. Their nuclear weapons were developed with Chinese/Korean help, probably pre-assembled there. Their testing only served one purpose, that of feeding their own ego. And though he could not have foreseen it, the international reaction in the long run to India and Pakistani testing has been widely different.
Mr. Sen then goes on to state that our testing would only deleteriously impact our chances to get into the UNSC. I don’t know who said that one of the reasons for our testing in ’98 was to “blast its way into the Security Council”. I don’t think anyone could be so immature. Nor, for that matter, would our remaining non-nuclear have given us the seat. It’s in the interests of the permanent members to restrict membership to that exclusive club and maintain status quo and no idealism on our part would have induced them to change their view.
What he reads into the joint statement released by China and the US on these events as a policy decision allying the two nations, conveniently forgetting that the US’ stance on the situation in this corner of the world changes from day to day, witness their constantly shifting position on Pakistan for instance. If it is to their interest they’d be issuing joint statements in Delhi every other day.
Finally i feel Mr. Sen gives too much importance to our nuclear testing as if it’s the defining event in India’s history and not a jot of all the rest matters. As history has shown since, India’s growing importance as an economic power overshadowed any moral concerns the West had over our nuclearisation and they are falling all over themselves to do business with us in that very field.